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Abstract: 
This exploration into the multiple effects of medical marijuana laws on regional 
marketplaces uses a novel data set and contributes three unique and important findings. First, in 
states with medical marijuana legislation the price of marijuana is significantly lower than states 
without similar legislation, this is likely due to measures that allow for legalized avenues of 
production and distribution. Secondly, because of price breaks for bulk purchases, retail level 
distributers operate on a downward sloping supply curve that is less steep in medical marijuana 
states; this is likely due to decreased risk of distribution which may reduce preference for lower 
margin, higher volume transactions. Finally, in states with medical marijuana laws, variance in 
purchase price is substantially less, presumably due to the decreased cost of information seeking 
and decreased risk of advertisement.
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Introduction: 
As conventional policies aimed at curbing marijuana consumption continue to fall short, 
new information is necessary to motivate better, more effective drug policy. There is no 
comprehensive body of literature about the institutions and functions of the marijuana 
marketplace, nor has there been an in-depth analysis of the market effects of medical marijuana 
legislation, an important step in understanding the most commonly used illicit drug in the United 
States. (The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2009) While this 
paper does not attempt to provide a comprehensive understanding of marijuana markets, it begins 
to fill the void in research surrounding the effects of medical marijuana laws on markets by 
surveying the myriad effects of legislation on transactions. 
Recently a new body of data has become available which allows for an in depth look into 
the retail level market for marijuana. Not only is the data rich with important information on 
price, quality and location, but it also overcomes some of the non-random sampling and 
reliability issues of other data sets that have limited the power of previous research. This data 
along with important contributions from other authors makes possible, a more accurate, yet 
preliminary look into the effects of medical marijuana laws that alter the structure and 
institutions of existing marketplaces. 
 
Literature Review:  
A great deal of research has been done into marijuana markets, the determinants of their 
prices and apparent geographic discrepancy in pricing.  Studies have explored the supply-side 
effects of various drug policies and their impact on perceived danger of distribution using the 
theory of the rational criminal as the basis for their analysis. (Reuter & Kleiman, 1986) Many 
papers have implied a geographic difference in the price of marijuana and many contemporary 
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studies concerning the markets for marijuana validate the assumption that the demand curve for 
marijuana is downward sloping and that marijuana is a normal good (Clements, 2004, Caulkins 
& Pacula, 2006) 
A central concern in much of the research of illicit marketplaces is the quality and 
availability of data, particularly in the case of drug marketplaces where transaction level data is 
powerful, yet hard to come by. Clements uses collected prices of marijuana over a span of 9 
years through undercover police purchases of unknown quantities and qualities, data collection 
methods that, while useful, at the very least present issues of non-random sampling and omitted 
variable bias. (Clements, 2004) Other models and papers have used both the Arrestee Drug 
Abuse Monitoring Program which only observe arrestees reported price per unit. Similarly, the 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health, observations were over-sampled to obtain better 
estimates for Black and Hispanic users and do not account for geographical differences. 
(Caulkins & Pacula) 
Clements (2004) estimates demand in Australian markets using data acquired from 
undercover police purchases. He tests for effects in the varying degrees of legality on 
consumption and finds evidence for individual, regional marketplaces, decreasing prices over 
time and a downward sloping demand curve. Additionally, Clements finds evidence of 
discounted pricing with increasing quantities, possibly because of risk associated with every 
transaction or other types of transactions costs.  
Clements and Zhao, in their detailed book Economics and Marijuana (2010) have found 
that recently marijuana has undergone a “hydroponic revolution.” Because marijuana can be 
grown indoors it is no longer necessary that it only grown solely in areas conducive to outdoor 
cultivation. This gives additional strength to the theory that regional market places are possible 
and probable and has interesting implications on where marijuana can be grown as it no longer 
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requires an ideal natural climate. Clements and Zhao have also proposed that marijuana 
packaging, particularly as it relates to bulk discounts, is similar to other legal goods in that higher 
volume transactions are preferred when transactions costs are a significant factor. Additionally, 
they provide arguments explaining that some of the disparity in price paid between two 
otherwise identical buyers is likely to information asymmetry and may not reflect any 
substantive difference in product. 
Caulkins & Pacula (2006) analyze The Substance Abuse And Mental Health Services 
Administration’s National Household Survey on Drug Abuse and give insight into the structure 
of the retail market. They find that over half of marijuana users have received marijuana for free 
in 2001, however they make no distinction between smoking marijuana with others for free 
versus receiving it in loose form. Most importantly, they distinguish marijuana transactions from 
those that take place in open-air markets, as is typical for a heroin, cocaine, crack-cocaine or 
methamphetamine transactions. Instead, they provide empirical evidence to suggest that the 
majority of marijuana transactions take place in users’ or dealers’ homes or semi-private spaces. 
This paints a picture of marijuana markets rooted in social circles rather than a more typical, 
impersonal black market. Because marijuana transactions are typically between friends and 
acquaintances rather than in open-air markets, information asymmetries could lead to larger 
discrepancies in price between two otherwise equal buyers. This type of marketplace suggest that 
retail level distributers may not take into account risk associated with distribution the same way 
as distributers might, as the risks of getting caught are presumably lower due to a different 
market structure and controlled clientele.  
Finally, much of the literature surrounding the topic suggests that marijuana markets are 
largely understudied. Pacula et al (2007) makes this explicitly clear when acknowledging that 
virtually no work has been done on estimating a supply curve for marijuana. Pacula et al have 
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argued that the supply curve is upward sloping, however the reasoning employed to reach that 
conclusion had little empirical support. 
 
General Theory: 
 Most illegal drugs’ rates of usage vary across geography.1 (Substance Abuse And Mental 
Health Services Administration, 2007) Although both marijuana and agricultural products show 
geographical price and consumption differences, they are likely not caused by the same thing. 
One of the many explanations for the regional variances in marijuana usage is cultural and social 
norms, acceptability and regional habit (tastes and preferences). One would expect that 
equilibrium price will affect willingness to purchase marijuana based on social and legal 
consequences. Using this reasoning, variables that approximate these norms or rates of usage 
may represent demand shifters. Supply may also be affected by similar variables if one were to 
assume that social acceptability and risk of being prosecuted were correlated. Unfortunately, 
there is no reliable data available directly relating to the social acceptability of marijuana or 
exact quantity consumed on a per state basis. There are, however, other estimates that can serve 
some of the same functions like medical marijuana laws and less accurate estimates of the 
number of marijuana users per state. 
 The effect of medical marijuana laws is particularly nuanced because of its implications 
on both supply and demand. Medical marijuana laws are proposed by those who believe 
marijuana to beneficial and passed by a majority who agree; in this light, beliefs about the drug 
can be understood as indicators of social acceptability. Assuming this is true and that social 
acceptability is a possible demand shifter, we may expect medical marijuana laws to represent a 
relative increase in demand and therefore price. Another possible effect of medical marijuana 
                                                        
1
 SAMHSA’s data corroborates the widely understood notion that certain drugs are more 
prevalent in certain areas. For instance, heroin is much more widely used in urban areas. 
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laws on demand is that medical laws make marijuana commercially available to patients of even 
the most minor conditions, if we assume that these users would not otherwise be purchasing 
marijuana, we would expect to see increases in demand. Interpreting the effect of medical 
marijuana laws on price is complicated by the assumption that the laws almost certainly have an 
effect on supply. One of many possible effects of medical marijuana laws on supply is that 
certain channels of distribution become legalized. As the number of growers and distributers 
increases we would expect an increase in supply that would have a downward effect on price.  
Interestingly, the legitimization of certain means of cultivation and distribution may lead 
to more perfect information between buyers and sellers. For instance, in many local newspapers 
there are advertisements for different qualities, quantities and prices of marijuana readily 
available to the consumer that may have the effect of stabilizing marijuana prices in a given 
market. If retailers can advertise prices, it may induce competition among legitimate and 
illegitimate distributers under the assumption that medical and non-medical marijuana are 
competing goods. If this is true, we would expect to see variance negatively correlated with 
Medical Marijuana Laws in tests for heteroscedasticity, a topic which will be explored later in 
the paper. 
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Data: 
Data primarily comes from priceofweed.com, a crowd sourced, anonymously submitted 
index that contains information on quantity purchased, amount paid, quality2 and location. One 
of the main advantages to this database is that it is a large data set. After cleaning data for 
observations that likely represent non-armslength transactions (less than $2 per gram) there are 
still more than 23,000 complete observations. While the database is not entirely a random sample 
as certain groups of users3 will be more likely to report, visitors have no incentive to submit 
faulty information. Aside from access issues, the website is open to all, limiting issues of non-
random sampling. An important limitation to note in this data is that reported quantity is 
truncated at one ounce; this limitation has implications when attempting to estimate a complete 
supply curve.  
Along with the information regarding quantity quality and price, other demographic and 
descriptive data have been added to observations based on location to control for other factors. 
Data on drug use per state is gathered from The Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program and 
The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. Data on statewide median 
income, population density and education is gathered from the US Census Bureau. We have 
collected data on the legal status of marijuana from norml.org.  
We believe that because marijuana is a normal good so median income (in thousands) 
will have a positive effect on both quantity and price as it is likely a demand shifter. Population 
density (measured in hundreds of people per square mile) also is likely another demand shifter in 
that, given a normal distribution of marijuana users, it approximates number of consumers4. 
                                                        
2
 A subjective rating of high, medium or low quality 
3
 Reporting on the website requires that you have Internet access and the interest to visit the site 
and share purchase data. 
4
 We recognize that population density on the state level is imperfect and might be better suited 
in a county specific as population is not uniformly distributed throughout the state, however we 
still believe it to be useful, particularly in regions with smaller state size like New England. 
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Lastly, we’ve added a the percentage of individuals in a given state who have consumed 
marijuana in the past month, we believe this to be an indicator of cultural norms surrounding 
marijuana and an indicator of the structure and robustness of the market considering it is, in part, 
a socially distributed drug.  
Table 1: 
 Mean 
Quantity 
(grams) 
Mean PPG Median 
Population 
Density  
Mean 
Median 
Income 
($1000) 
Mean 
Marijuana 
Use  
% MMJ 
laws 
n 
Division 1 13.14 $13.02  6.46 $60.84  24.24% 67% 1873 
Division 2 13.34 $13.19  5.04 $55.40  17.62% 33% 3503 
Division 3 13.17 $11.60  2.08 $48.34  16.89% 20% 3559 
Division 4 13.09 $12.24  0.58 $49.03  15.17% 0% 1724 
Division 5 13.77 $11.81  5.6 $49.89  16.53% 33% 4167 
Division 6 14.72 $10.74  1.18 $40.41  14.96% 0% 830 
Division 7 14.6 $12.30  0.89 $45.93  11.97% 0% 1686 
Division 8 14.06 $11.04  0.36 $50.63  17.88% 63% 1593 
Division 9 14.15 $10.69  1.82 $57.25  17.58% 100% 4064 
U.S. 13.69 $11.87  3.13 $51.98  17.15% 40% 23023 
 
Table 2: 
 n Percentage 
Observations 23023 - 
High Quality 14066 61% 
Medium Quality 7514 33% 
Low Quality 1443 6% 
Medical Marijuana State 
Observations 
8337 36% 
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Regions: 
Because demographic data is captured at the statewide level, we have grouped states into 
regions to avoid perfect colinearity with demographic data. We believe this to be a reasonable 
solution considering that regional market places likely span across state lines. Regional dummys 
are comprised of more than one state and grouped with other similar contiguous states according 
to the US Census groupings.  
Divisions: asterisks indicate medical marijuana laws 
 
Division 1 – New England: Connecticut*, Maine*, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island* and Vermont* 
Division 2 – Middle Atlantic: New Jersey*, New York and Pennsylvania 
Division 3 – East North Central: Indiana, Illinois, Michigan*, Ohio and Wisconsin 
Division 4 – West North Central: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota 
and South Dakota 
Division 5 – South Atlantic: Delaware*, DC*, Florida, Georgia, Maryland*, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia 
Division 6 – East South Central: Alabama Kentucky, Mississippi and Tennessee 
Division 7- West South Central: Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas 
Division 8 - Mountain: Arizona*, Colorado*, Idaho, New Mexico*, Montana*, Utah, Nevada* 
and Wyoming 
Division 9 - Pacific: Alaska*, California*, Hawaii*, Oregon* and Washington* 
Medical Marijuana States: Washington, Vermont, Rhode Island, Oregon, New Mexico, New 
Jersey, Nevada, Montana, Michigan, Maryland, Maine, Nevada, Hawaii, The District of 
Columbia, Delaware, Connecticut, Colorado, California, Alaska and Arizona 
 
Initial Regression: 
 
Price
  β	 
 Σ divisions 
 βMedianIncome 
 βMarijuanaUse 
 βPrcBachelorsDegree

 β HighQuality 
 β%LowQuality 
 β(MedicalMarijuana 
 β)PopulationDensity

 β+PopulationDensitySquared 
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Table 3 - Results: 
Price Per OZ Coefficient Std Error T P 
   R
2
=.24 n=23023 
Population Density -2.953986 0.7983596 -3.7 0 
Population Density
 
Squared 
0.0402457 0.0079159 5.08 0 
Median Income (100) 4.096214 0.249347 16.43 0 
Marijuana use 18-25 -1.269789 0.4625847 -2.74 0.01 
Bachelors Degree % -1.278114 0.2803891 -4.56 0 
High Quality 125.2319 2.025976 61.81 0 
Low Quality -100.7192 4.073455 -24.73 0 
Medical Marijuana Laws -24.31816 3.494288 -6.96 0 
Division 1 79.26636 6.885485 11.51 0 
Division 2 81.71779 5.25806 15.54 0 
Division 3 54.51247 4.446999 12.26 0 
Division 4 57.81926 5.089843 11.36 0 
Division 5 52.63758 4.633712 11.36 0 
Division 6 53.7629 6.789829 7.92 0 
Division 7 63.19737 5.525882 11.44 0 
Division 8 16.09983 4.426812 3.64 0 
Constant 72.88119 12.6692 5.75 0 
 
All regional effects are statistically significant. The omitted division which all other 
divisions are measured relative to is division 9. Division 9 has the lowest prices out of all other 
regions as all other divisions have positive coefficients. Coefficients on quality are intuitive and 
indicate that high-grade marijuana is more expensive per ounce than medium-grade marijuana 
and low-grade marijuana sells for $100 less on average than mid-grade. 
 The population density quadratic indicates there may be a population density that allows 
for the lowest prices. At very low population densities, there may be significant transaction and 
transportation costs that contribute to increased prices. Additionally, the social structure of 
marijuana distribution implies that as population increases, social networks may form allowing 
easier purchase and lower costs. It may be the case that relatively high population densities are in 
urban areas where drug enforcement is a higher priority, raising the associated risk and therefore 
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price. More likely is that if marijuana smokers are somewhat randomly distributed, higher 
densities mean more demand, and thus higher prices.5 If we accept the explanations for the U-
shaped quadratic, it follows that there is a population density where law enforcement is not a 
significant issue nor is the effect of price bidding, yet where there is enough demand to sustain a 
marijuana production and consumption to be the point where, all else equal, prices are lowest.  
The coefficient on median income supports the assumption that marijuana is a normal 
good. Holding all else constant, for every thousand dollars median increases, the model predicts 
a ~$4 increase in price per ounce. Median income as a demand shifter plays in important role 
later when estimating a supply curve that necessitates the use of an instrument associated with 
demand.   
 
Structure of Medical Marijuana Markets: 
In most states with medical marijuana laws, production and distribution are not regulated 
to the extent that most other consumer commodities are. There are no solid figures to estimate 
production, distribution and retail sales because there are no independent institutions designed to 
do so. Medical marijuana is in most states a relatively new concept, and because of the 
discrepancy between state and federal law, medical markets maintain questionable legal status.  
Some states have legislated a distribution system that allows small businesses to purchase 
marijuana from growers and sell to patients who have been referred by doctors. These systems 
allow some monitoring of the market in that they provide licenses to dispensaries and monitor 
doctor referrals, however they do not monitor where marijuana is coming from or how much is 
being grown. (Regan, 2011) Other states like Rhode Island have until recently determined that 
                                                        
5
 It is worth noting that the model only takes into account statewide population density, and that 
most of the higher density states are located on the east coast where prices may be higher for 
other reasons as well.  
 12
they would provide medical marijuana cards to patients but leave it to patients to acquire it by 
any means necessary, generally through established drug dealers. (Rhode Island Department of 
Health, 2006) So, although these states are all considered to have medical marijuana laws, the 
institutions governing them can be quite different from state to state. 
In most states with dispensary style distribution, there are no requirements regarding the 
business structure of the dispensaries and few guidelines for growers. Because of the lax nature 
of the laws, many sellers operate for-profit enterprises that in some areas can be intensely 
competitive, take for example the 750 registered dispensaries in Los Angeles alone or the 187 
advertising in Washington state on the registry legalmarijuanadispensary.com, a website with an 
index of individual dispensaries products and prices. (Kelsey, 2012) 
 The competitive nature of some states’ marketplaces have incited a variety of sellers to 
enter the market, however because of the questionable legal standing of the industry, the types of 
entrepreneurs in the industry vary. Although the Department of Justice has made it clear that they 
will not prosecute any enterprise expressly following state laws, they have on more than one 
occasion seized the property of and prosecuted persons flaunting their wealth and excessive scale 
of operations. (DEA, 2011) Take for instance Chris Bartkowicz of Colorado who after appearing 
in a local news spot about the emerging marijuana economy found himself the subject of a 
federal investigation and lawsuit. Similarly, take Luke Scarmazzo, a successful medical 
marijuana businessman only to be taken down after releasing a rap video in which he refers to 
the DEA unfavorably. (Huffington Post, 2011) Considering the competitive nature of the 
industry and the very real incentives to keep a low profile and profit reasonable, it is perfectly 
clear why prices are in part lower in states with medical marijuana dispensaries. In these states, 
owners have little ability to set prices and even if they did, they would have every incentive to 
limit either scale of operations or price. 
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Determinants of Medical Marijuana Laws: 
 Considering that medical marijuana laws are usually passed by voters, a look into the 
demographic factors that determine the existence of medical laws might be revealing. Using the 
data already collected, a simple regression in the following form helps to understand the basics 
of what makes medical marijuana laws more likely in a state.  
 
./01234 5367   8	932:/4;<7=/><//?@A 
 8?;BC43D1;E=/E71DF 
 8./013EGE2;H/ 

8 .3<1IC3E3J7/  
 
Table 4: 
Medical Marijuana Law 
Dummy 
Coef. Std. Err. T P 
Bachelors Degree Percentage -0.0276854 0.0079397 -3.49 0.001 
Population Density 0.0061687 0.002444 2.52 0.015 
Median Income 0.0327159 0.0075696 4.32 0.000 
Marijuana Use 0.0485821 0.0129522 3.75 0.000 
Constant -1.405018 0.3563571 -3.94 0.000 
 
 Because Medical Marijuana Laws are represented by a dummy variable, each coefficient 
is interpreted as a percentage change in the likelihood of marijuana laws. In this regression, 
every one percent increase in regular marijuana use for 18-25 year olds indicates an increase in 
the likelihood of medical marijuana laws in that state by 4 percent - not surprising considering 
the democratic process.  
While these results are indicative of a link between marijuana use and medical marijuana, 
causation is still not certain considering the limited nature of the data. One argument may be that 
given medical marijuana laws, a larger portion of legitimate and illegitimate medical users will 
consume medical marijuana on a regular basis; this type of explanation argues that increased 
marijuana use is caused by medical laws. Another argument would be to say that populations 
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with high rates of marijuana usage are more likely to vote medical marijuana laws into existence; 
this type of explanation argues that medical marijuana laws are caused by populations with 
relatively higher marijuana usage.  
 It its likely that medical marijuana laws are not randomly distributed as roughly 
evidenced by the regression above. Although it should come as no surprise, there is a subtle 
implication involved. If medical marijuana laws cannot be determined to be random, differences 
in marijuana markets between states with and without medical marijuana laws are not necessarily 
caused by the laws themselves and may be due to preexisting structural differences in the 
marketplaces. This is not to say that we cannot be sure that medical marijuana laws have any 
effect on markets. As we’ve already explored, medical marijuana laws do significantly change 
the structure of cultivation, distribution and retail. 
 
Estimating A Supply Curve: 
 
 Estimating a supply curve for all marijuana purchases will help us to understand the 
general market before distinguishing between medical marijuana market supply curves and 
others. Both price and quantity are equilibrium outcomes meaning that they are both 
simultaneously determined by supply and demand. We assume the supply equation takes the 
standard form: KL   8	 
 8?<12/ 
 8..M 
 8N1>: KC341DF 
 8 5;6 KC341DF 
 C, we 
add the medical marijuana dummy to control for differences between the two presumably 
different markets. Demand quantity may be expressed by an equation similar to K0 
 8	
8?<12/ 
 8./013E GE2;H/ 
 C where median income is positively correlated with 
quantity under the assumption that marijuana is a normal good.  
 Estimating the supply curve with two stage least squares requires the use of an instrument 
correlated with demand but not supply. In the first stage regression, median income proved to be 
correlated with price; with the additional reasonable assumption that median income is a demand 
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shifter and uncorrelated with price, median income serves as a good instrument for our two stage 
least squares supply regression. 
 Because the data from priceofweed.com is censored at one ounce, the dependent variable 
is truncated at the source of collection. In order to get better estimates from a censored variable, 
a tobit model with a right bound at one ounce can be used to test for robustness along with the 
results of OLS. 
Table 5:   
The results of the supply regressions not controlling for region with p scores in parenthesis 
 
Grams OLS Tobit 
Price -0.51 (0.00) -0.75 (0.00) 
Medical Marijuana Laws 0.07(0.67) 0.16(0.54) 
Low Quality 2.81 (0.00) 4.61 (0.00) 
High Quality 2.11 (0.00) 3.21 (0.00) 
Constant 18.27 (0.00) 23.74 (0.00) 
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Table 6:  
Controlling for region 
Grams OLS Tobit 
Price -0.54 (0.00) -0.75 (0.00) 
Medical Marijuana Laws 0.63 (0.00) 0.99 (0.00) 
Low Quality 2.64 (0.00) 4.50 (0.00) 
High Quality 2.25 (0.00) 3.20 (0.00) 
Division 1 0.68 (0.11) 0.85 (0.20) 
Division 2 1.18 (0.01) 1.55 (0.02) 
Division 3 0.09 (0.78) 0.02 (0.97) 
Division 4 0.36 (0.39) 0.54 (0.40) 
Division 5 0.83 (0.01) 1.10 (0.03) 
Division 6 1.39 (0.00) 2.14 (0.00) 
Division 7 1.85(0.00) 2.87 (0.00) 
Division 8 0.084 (0.78) 0.17 (0.73) 
Constant 17.75 (0.00) 22.64 (0.00) 
 
There are two distinct ways to interpret the results. First we will explore them under the 
assumption that what we are actually estimating is a production supply curve. Under this 
assumption, the results show a downward sloping supply curve; for every increase of one dollar, 
quantity falls somewhere between a quarter to two thirds of a gram. Although the results seem 
counterintuitive considering the traditional slope usually assumed to slope upward, there may be 
an explanation considering the illicit nature of marijuana. 
 The classic slope of the average cost curve is a U shape, sloping downward at smaller 
quantities. One explanation of a downward sloping supply curve considering the results would be 
to say that since a supply curve is derived from a firm’s marginal cost curve, at lower quantities 
of production the supply curve actually does slope down. Due to the illicit nature of the 
marijuana market, suppliers may never reach minimum efficient scale. Marijuana cultivation is 
efficient in quantities not possible for the average illicit grower. It is estimated that costs minus 
 processing for a single, legal acre grow site c
minimum of $215 for a 1500 square foot grow house
 While the inability to reach minimum efficient scale is a
conclude that to be the case or exclude other possibilities
retail level. As we have specified in the regression equation, price is independent and quantity 
responds, however at the retail level it 
independent of each other. Clements
products in bundling and packaging which result in price breaks for increased quantities. 
(Clements & Zhao, 2009) A quick break down of average cost per gram relative to common 
packaged quantities reveals the following: 
Table 7: 
Quantity
Eigth Ounce
Quarter Ounce
Half Ounce
One Ounce
Graph 1: 
Considering the transaction and transportation costs along with possible risks associated 
with distributing marijuana, retailers and distributers
ould be as low as $70 per pound compared to a 
. (Caulkins, 2010) 
n elegant explanation,
 because our data is truncated at the 
is likely that neither price or quantity are entirely 
 writes that marijuana exhibits certain similarities to other 
 
 Average Price Per Gram 
 14.8 
 11.7 
 9.9 
 9.1 
 
 may offer price breaks for larger purchases 
17
 we cannot 
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of marijuana. Preference for a slightly a lower margin but higher volume transaction that 
decreases associated transaction costs and risks would explain a downward sloping retail level 
supply curve independently of any possible production factors. In an illicit market place, each 
transaction exposes both parties to risk and each transaction also imposes a cost on the distributer 
because, if nothing else, transactions take time to complete. If it were true that distributers were 
adverse to increased implicit costs and risk, we would expect to see markets with lower 
transactions costs and risk associated with a transaction exhibit a less steep, flat or possibly 
positively sloped supply curve.  
 
Differentiated Supply Curve: 
Regional markets with medical marijuana laws and quasi-legitimate forms of distribution 
may exhibit an upward sloping, flat or less steep downward sloping supply curve for several 
reasons. The medical marijuana market as earlier shown to have a downward effect on marijuana 
prices in some markets must allow for some legal avenues of cultivation and distribution which 
may be more efficient because of larger operations. Additionally and more relevant to our data, 
with established retailers and less damning laws, transactions costs and risk may be less of a 
determinant of price in a retail market.  
Creating an interaction variable between medical marijuana laws and price effectively 
separates out the supply curves of medical marijuana states and those without the laws. If the 
assumption that medical marijuana states have a different supply curves holds, then we would 
expect to see an additional statistically significant, negative coefficients on the interaction and 
price variable. Adding it to the instrumented regression equation we should expect a less 
downward sloping supply curve with price plus the interaction term than with just price alone. 
 Equation: 
Price is instrumented with median income as in the first equation.
Table 9: 
Grams: 
Price 
Medical Marijuana Laws
Medical Marijuana 
Interaction 
Low Quality 
High Quality 
Constant 
  
Graph 2: A visual representation
 
 
All results are statistically significant 
that in states with medical marijuana laws, suppliers are operating on a less steep 
This is consistent with earlier conjectures that medical marijuana laws may serve to lower 
transactions costs along with risk 
 
OLS Tobit 
-0.29 (0.01) -0.43 (0.02) 
 7.20 (0.00) 10.73 (0.00) 
Price -0.61 (0.00) -0.90 (0.00) 
3.27 (0.00) 5.30 (0.00) 
1.63 (0.00) 2.49 (0.00 
15.87 (0.00) 20.15 (0.00) 
 using OLS estimates 
and give expected signs. The results here indicate 
associated with distribution, thereby lowering the incentive to 
19
  
 
supply curve. 
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provide price breaks for larger quantities.  
Variance in Markets: 
 Earlier in the paper we posited that some medical marijuana laws have helped to make a 
more competitive marketplace. We assume that this is in part due to provisions that allow the 
establishment of dispensaries that decrease the cost to buyers and suppliers to distribute and seek 
information. If this is true we may expect to see less variance in price paid for purchases made in 
medical marijuana states. To get this information we will take u2 from the first stage regression 
and regress all relevant variables including medical marijuana laws on the squared term. If 
medical marijuana laws do help to create a more competitive market and stabilize price, we 
would expect to see statistically significant negative coefficients associated with medical 
marijuana laws.  
Table 10: 
Variance Coef. 
Medical Marijuana Laws -3278.86 (0.048) 
Low Quality -217.98 (0.922) 
High Quality -9939.01 (0.00) 
Marijuana Use -433.62 (0.051) 
Median Income ($1000) 265.92 (0.003) 
Population Density 30.59 (0.693) 
Division 1 1930.19 (0.509) 
Division 2 697.50 (0.759) 
Division 3 156.56 (0.943) 
Division 4 -280.20 (0.919) 
Division 5 2422.81 (0.287) 
Division 6 4784.21 (0.165) 
Division 7 3768.37 (0.210) 
Division 8 -2093.90 (0.373) 
Constant 19722.98 (0.003) 
 
 When medical retailers or other distributers do not face the same risks associated with 
advertising and information as other distributers might, the costs of advertising go down and new 
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opportunities to distribute information arise. As distributers are able to disseminate information 
and users can find information more readily, buyers are better able to find lower prices and 
distributers are pressured to compete. Results from the equation suggest that medical marijuana 
laws reduce variance of price paid as do high and medium quality. These results give empirical 
weight to our argument that due to the institutional changes in markets caused by medical 
marijuana laws, price information becomes more readily available and prices are more stable. 
 
Conclusion: 
 This paper provides empirical evidence of significant price effects of medical marijuana 
laws. Medical marijuana laws tend to decrease price, variance in pricing, and pricing breaks for 
larger purchases. Presumably downward effects on price are due to legalized avenues of 
production that increase supply, making marijuana comparatively cheaper than non medical 
marijuana states. We assume that decreased variance in pricing is largely due to the changes in 
market structure that medical marijuana laws allow, mainly that advertising and information 
seeking is less costly. Finally, we find evidence that the supply curve for medical marijuana is 
relatively less steep but still downward sloping compared to non-medical marijuana states, this is 
likely due to decreased transaction costs and risk associated with distribution that lessen 
incentives to provide bulk discounts. In seeking explanation for unconventional supply curve 
results, we have developed interesting but weakly supported hypothesis about the production 
supply curve beyond observations of one ounce, however due to our data limitations no 
conclusion can be reached. 
 As always, a more robust model is possible. In this case, time, resources and availability 
of data limit designing a panel data model that can track price changes in a given state before and 
after medical marijuana laws took effect. This would be a better way to argue causality between 
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laws affecting supply and the effects we see here. Additionally, observations beyond one ounce 
could give more accurate insights into a production supply curve that is likely different from the 
retail curve we are able to analyze with our data. Future papers might soon be able to look into 
the differences in regional production due to the soon to be instituted legal reforms which make 
producing marijuana legal and will likely make accurate data collection an easier task. 
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